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THE IRRELEVANCE OF TH E INTENDED TO PRD~dl~:f._
FA CIE CU I_,PAIHLITY: COIVIMENT ON MO O RE
CL A IRE FINKELSTEIN*

I.

L AW AN D ORDI NAR Y MOR A Li TY

M icha el Mo ore argues that criminal and tort law em body diffe rent
types of culpability: Criminal law embodies the "culpabili ty of choi ce"
and tort law the "culpability of unexercised capacity." 1 Culpability of
choice means that one has "chosen to do a wrongful act," 2 whereas the
culpability of unexercised capacity "blames us despite our acting rightly
in the world as we see it. " 3 I wish to argue for the commonplace that the
correct distinction between criminal law and tort law is not that between
different forms of culpability, but rather that between culpability, on the
one hand, and responsibility in the absence of culpability, on the other.
Moore's view that both institutions involve culpability, I shall argue , is
drive n by a certain thesis he holds on the criminal law sid e, n ame ly that
the criminal law is organized around the notion of culpability but does
not reflect its structure. Although it is beyond the scope of this Co mment
to mount a general argument for the congruence of the criminal law and
ordinary morality, I shall argue that the two do not diverge on at le ast
one question on which Moore thinks they do, namely the relevance of
intending a prohibited act, as opposed to merely foreseeing it will foll ow
from what one intends. I shall also argue that this mistaken view of the
relation between criminal law and ordinary morality is what leads Moore
to think there are moral norms buried deep within the quite different
institution of civil liability: If criminal law can be fundam entally "about"
moral norms without reflecting their structure, it becomes plausible to
think the same might be true of tort law. If the criminal law is more or
less faithful to moral norms of culpability, we should be skeptical of any
attempt to find these same norms reflected in the rather di fferent institution of tort law.
* Actin g Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. I wish to th ank
Kurt Baie r, Peter Detre, David Gauthier, and Michael Thompson fo r the ir he lpful
criticism and suggestions.
1
2

3

Michael Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability, 76 B.U. L. REv. 319, 329 (1995) .
ld. at 320.
!d. at 328.
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THE CuLPABILITY OF CHOICE

A ccording to Moore , an agent is culpable when "he chooses to do
wrong in circumstances when that choice is freely made. " 4 Moore argues
there are three grades within the general category of choice-culpability,
each of which corresponds to one of three representational mental states
an agent can be in. 5 First, an agent can desire something for its own sake;
second , an age nt can intend something as a means to something else; or
third, an age nt can believe that something ob tains as a result of something
he does. Three agents, each of whom bears one of the above relatio ns to
the same prohibited act o r state of affairs, would have different levels of
culpability , according to Moo re : The first agent would be more culpable
than the second, and the second more culpable than the third. One
should be clear that Moore ascribes these levels to moral culpability,
aware as he is that the law does not grade culpability in precisely this
way. 6
First, I would like to tidy the picture a bit by recasting each of Moore's
categories within the language of intention. 7 After all, it is not that the
first and third categories have no place for talk of intention; it is rather
that the intention bears a different relation to the prohibited act or bad
state of affairs in each category. Let us suppose the thing in question is a
prohibited act, namely killing. 8 In the first category, when an agent kills
for its own sake, it would be better to say her intending to kill needs no
further explanation than that she desired to kill. In the third category
there is also something intended by the agent, but the thing intended is
not the thing for which we are assessing her culpability, namely killing.
Rather, in this case the agent's killing is a "side effect" of her doing something else, and it is the latter that is intended. We might, therefore , characterize Moore's three categories as follows:
1) An agent intends to 0 and 0-ing is an end in itself;
2) An agent intends to 0 and 0-ing is a means to \j/-ing;
4

!d. at 320.
!d. at 322-23.
6 /d. at 331-32.
7 I use the language of intention here as a convenience. I do no t mean to s uggest
that I accept what Michael Bratman calls " the thesis of the distinctiveness of intention," namely the thesis that "in tentions are distinctive states of mind , not to be reduced to desires and beliefs." Michael Bratman, Moore on Intention and Volition, 142
U. PENN. L. R Ev. 1705, 1706 (1994). Moore himself accepts the thesis. MICHAEL
MooRE, A cr AND CRIME: TH E PHILOSOPHY oF AcrroN AND ITs IM PLICATI ONS FOR
CRIMINAL LAW 120-21 (1993) .
8 Since we are discussing prima facie cupability, I do no t add " without justifica tion
or excuse. "
I should note as well that nothing is affected by treating the end as an action rather
than as a sta te of affairs . For o ur purposes, the two could be used interchangeably,
with minor linguistic adj ustmen ts.
5

1996]

THE IRRELEVANCE OF THE INTENDED

337

3) An agent intends to \If and \!l-ing is a means to x-ing, and the agent
knows that in \!l-ing he will ¢. 9
Now I think it can be shown that the above taxonomy is just a bit off
for Moore's purposes, and that he is concerned instead with the distinction between the first two categories taken together, on the one hand,
and the third category, on the other. Three reasons for tinkering with
Moore's divisions present themselves.
First, Moore's example of the first category is a person who kills because she takes pleasure in killing. 10 This is arguably not a case in which
killing is an end in itself, because it is no t killing, but rather pleasure, that
is th e end. Suppose, then, one were to treat killing, or perhaps more
plausibly, death, as the end. But an agent who treats death as an end an d
who spends her days bringing its gifts to oth ers should perhaps be regarded as an insane benevolent rather than a rational villain, and clearly this
is not what Moore has in mind. Moore must still be thinking of a case in
which the end can be articulated separately from the act-a case in which
a person violates a prohibitory norm for the sake of pleasure. True, the
"for the sake of" relation in this case is not an instrumental one, i.e., the
act is not the means to the end. If someone does something for pleasure,
his receipt of pleasure usually just consists in his doing of the act, so that
the act bears a constitutive , rather than an instrumental relation to the
end. But unless the distinction between constitutive and instrumental
acts is itself morally relevant, and I do not think Moore thinks it is , we
can treat all cases in which the end is articulated separately from the act
alike.
It may be that someone who kills for pleasure seems worse than someone who kills, say, for money, at least in some cases. That is, Moore's
intuition might be explained by the fact that the very content of the end
when an act is done for pleasure makes the act worse. But I think this
generalization must be resisted, since it will be difficult to sort the cases
by the content of the end alone. Is someone who kills for pleasure always
worse than someone who kills for spite? I think it would depend.
Second, even if Moore did have in mind a case in which the act truly is
desired for its own sake, it is doubtful that the distinction between intending something as an end in itself and intending something as a means
to a further end is at all significant. Both are a species of trying to get:
The agent in both cases wants to perform the action, and he is expending
energy to that effect. Although it might matter why he wants it, the fact
that in the one case he wants it, while in the other his wanting it can be
explained by his wanting something else, surely is not significant.
Third, a different distinction Moore makes shows greater promise,
namely that between aiming at a certain result and merely fore seeing the
9

One might also allow, as a variant on the third category, a case in which the side
effect is produced by an act that is an end in itself.
10
Moore, supra note 1, at 323.
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resultY Of course this distinction will only set Moore's third category
r
).., .
.
f ar as agents w h o ao
' evu"] acts 10r
.t:
" 1 .
apart :r.:rom
uls fi rst two, mso
t 1e1r own
sake ," agents who do evil acts for the sake of pieasure, and agents who do
e vil acts for other reasons, such as money, all aim themselves at "evil."
The relevant distinction , then , would be betwee n Moore 's first two categories taken together, on the one hand, and his third category, on the
o ther. Focusing on this distinction organizes Moore 's claim around a
que stion that is familiar in the history of ethics, namely 1vhether, as Philippa Foot says, "the difference between aiming at something and obliquely intending it is in itself relevant to moral decisions. " 12 O f course
I'vfoore 's version of an affirmative answer to Foot's question is couch ed in
the language of culpability: His claim is that it is relevant for de terminin g
a person's level of culpability that she aimed at, rather than me rely fo re saw, that she would do an evil thing.
Let us say that if an agen t aims at evil she imends evil, and that if an
agent merely foresees that what she does will produce evil, she intentionally brings a bout evil that she does not intend. 13 We can thus state the
heart of Moore's position as follows: Agents who do evil acts are more
culpable when they intend to do them than when they merely do them
intentionally, not intending to do them.

III.

THE INTUITIVE CASE FOR THE DISTINCTION

The main point I wish to make about Moore's position, stated thus, is
that the assertion of the moral relevance of intending something, rather
than merely doing it intentionally, is at odds with Moore's claim that the
essence of culpability is that one has chosen to do a bad thing. If culpability i.s grounded in choice, and if choice is present both in cases in
which harm is intended and in cases in which it is merely brought about
intentionally, what would justify the assertion that agents are more culpable if they intend harm rather than merely bring it about intentionally? I
shall suggest that Moore is right to ground culpability in choice, but I
shall also argue that a choice-based model implies that whether some11

/d. at 324.
Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and th e Doctrine of Double Effecr , in
VIRTUES AND VICES 19, 24 (1978). Foot follows Bentham in refening to what an
agent foresees as following from his voluntary act, but does not intend, as "obliquely
intended." See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AN D LEGISLATION
ch. VIII, § 6. I eschew the terminology, because I think it is misleading to suggest that
foreseeing can be a kind of intending.
13 vVnile this terminology will seem objectionable to many, philosophers who work
on problems of intention are increasingly becoming aware of the benefits of drawing
the distinction in such terms. See Bratman, supra note 7, at 1713-14 (rejecting \Vhat
he calls the "Simple View," which maintains that one can infer a sentence of the form
"A intended to 0" from a sentence of the form "A 0-ed intentionally").
12
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thing done intentionall y was also intended is irrelevant for judgments of
culpability.
lvloore supports the relevance of the intended to culpability uniquely
by intuitions garnered from certain pai rs of cases, such as that of the terror bornber and the strategic bomber. 14 I shali no t rehearse the facts of
these cases here . Granting, for the moment, the intuition that the terror
bomber is more culpable than the strategic bomber, the question is
v;hethe r th ere is a coherent theory that can explain the intuition. Moo re
does not so much argue for such a thesis as assert it, claiming that " [t]he
cogni ti ve state of belief ... is thus not sufficient to raise th e most serious
le vels of culp ability." 15 But, as !vloore m usr recognize , we have more in
':h is case than just the cognitive state of belie f; we ha ve an intenti on to \ jJ
<md a belief that in \11-ing one will 0 . O n Moore's view, this amounts to a
choice to ¢, and so Moore must claim that choosing to 0 is insuffici ent for
being maximally culpable for 0-ing. B ut if this is true, there must be
something, in addition to choice, that makes the maximally culpabl e agent
so culpable. The extra something cannot be the fact that the maxim ally
culpable agent intended to ¢, because thi s would be circul ar. We appear
to have no other candidates.
A lternatively, Moore could deny th at an agent chooses to do what she
does intentionally but does not intend. Th at is, he could claim that choice
tracks what is intended and not what is merely done intentionally. In this
case, however, "culpability of choice " would apply only to what is inte nded, thus omitting such dastardly deeds as the killing of passengers by one
who blows up a plane for the sake of insurance money. 16 Culpability of
choice, then, would not exhaust culpability proper, and we would require
another account of the latter.
Since intuition supplies the only reason we have to think the intended
14

Moore, supra note 1, at 324.
!d. It is puzzling th a t Moore unequivocally asserts th a t belief is also not a nece ssary condi tion for the most serious levels of culpability. !d. The claim is mea nt to
accommodate a certain kind of low probability case, for ex a mpl e, if I tak e aim at you
and fire, thinking it highly improbable that I will succeed in hitting yo u. !d. at 324-25.
Moore takes th e position that one can intend to¢ without beli eving tha t on e will 0.
But one might distinguish here between choice and intention. The belief th a t by doing a cert ain thing I will ¢, or at least that the re is a reasonabl e lik elihood I will ¢ , is
plausibly a necessary condition for my choosing to ¢. If I try to do som e thing I believe I have only a five p ercent chance of accomplishing, it would be bett e r to say that
I choose to try to do th e thing than that I choose to do it. This, moreove r , gives the
right result on the level of culpability: We could not convict a person of a crime for
which the requisite m ens rea was " knowingly" if she thought th e odds th a t she would
do the thin g in question were this low, even if she were trying to do it. Since, as I
unde rstand Moore, it is the choice to 0 that mak es an agent culpabl e for ¢-ing (when
0 -ing is a bad deed) , beli ef should be necessary for the most serious le vels of culpability.
16 See id. at 323.
15
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significant for culpability, we might at this point question the institution's
credentials. Similarly structured cases suggest that at the very least the
intuition fails to generalize. Consider the follmving two cases. In Case 1,
I am the beneficiary of your life insurance policy and I wish to collect. I
set fire to my house in the hope of killing you while you are asleep inside .
In Case 2, I have a homeowner's policy on my house on which I wish to
collect. I set fire to my house, knowing that you are asleep inside and
that if I succeed in burning down the house you will sure ly die . Moreover, I know that if I wait an hour, you will have left th e house to go to
work . I burn down the house now, however, indiffe re nt to whether you
pe rish or live. In Case 1, I intend to kill you, and I kill you intentionally.
In Case 2, I also kill you intentionally, but I do not intend to kill you.
If Moore is correct , the agent in Case 1 is worse than the agent in Case
2, for the person who kills from an intention to kill is supposedly more
culpable than the person who merely kills intentionally , not intending to
kill. But these cases defy the intuition. The agent who does not have to
kill to obtain her end , but does so anyway in a state of indifference, seems
worse than the agent who must kill and does so in order to accomplish
her end . The agent who intends to kill might place a higher intrinsic
value on human life. Her actions are compatible with her having deep
regret at having to kill to obtain her end. Agent 2, however, could not
plausibly be said to place a high value on human life . She is indifferent to
the prospect of killing, to the point where she would rather kill than suffer a minor inconvenience.
Where prima facie culpability is concerned, then, the distinction between evil that is intended and evil that is merely done intentionally is of
dubious validity. Instead , what matters for prima facie culpability is that
the agent did the evil thing intentionally, or, under Moore's and my understanding of choice, that she has chosen to do it. Cases like the terror
bomber and the strategic bomber suggest there is perhaps more to the
story than this, but the something more need not pertain to the notion of
culpability. We shall discuss a possible alternate account of the intuition
below. 17
IV.

APPARENT ExcEPTIONS

There are two apparent exceptions to the irrelevance of the intended to
culpability. First, although the argument so far has been about moral, not
legal, culpability, one might consider the moral analogue to the category
of so-called "crimes of specific intent," that is, crimes for which the agent
must have performed the act with a certain purpose in mind. 18 For example , to be guilty of forgery, it is not enough to alter a writing intentionally.
17

See infra text accompanying note 28.
L. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTT,

18 WAYNE

JR. , CRIMI NA L L AW §

3.5(a) (1986).

1996)

Tl--IE IRRELEVA NCE OF THE INTENDED

341

One must alter the writing with the intention of COIThllitting a forgery. 19
Treason has traditionally had a similar structure. It is not enough to perfom1 various acts that aid the enemy intentionally. One must perform
those acts with the intention of assisting the enemy. 20
For evil deeds of this so rt, howeve r, it is not the case that the agent who
intends to perform them is more culpable than one who merely performs
ihe relevant act intentionally; the re is a total absence of culpability in the
abse nce of the re levant intention. In these cases, the prohibited act is not
the thing done intentionally, i.e., altering a wriring. The prohibited act is
th e act under its prohibi ted desc ription , namely fo rgery . One cannot, at
least in the case of forg e ry, perform the act without intending to perform
it. 21 The thesis we are considerin g-that doing a certain harm, inte nding
it, is worse than merely doing it intentionally-thus is not falsifi ed by
crimes of specific intent , for these crimes cannot be done " merely intentionally."
A second apparen t exception to the irrelevance of the intended arises
in a case in which an agent has violated a prohibitory norm for a reason
we regard as justifying the violation. Justifications, whether moral or
legal , speak to the purpose or intention with which an agent acted. 22
Most bad deeds are subject to justification, and thus every judgment of
culpability contains an implicit judgment about the agent 's intentions in
performing the act, namely that whatever the agent intended in performing it is not sufficient to justify his having done it.
Again, however, the exception is only an apparent one. First, the intention in this case operates subsequent to a judgment of prima facie culpability. Absence of justification, once all other conditions for culpability
19

See, for example, the de finition of forgery under New York law: "A p erson is
guilty of forgery in the first degree when , with intent to defraud, deceive or injure
another, he falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument." N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 170.15 (McKinney 1988) (emphasis added).
20 See, e.g., Rex v. Steane , [1947] 1 K.B. 997, 1003-06 (Crim. App .) (reversing defendant's conviction for treason on grounds that defendant did not broadcast for enemy with intent to assist enemy, but rather to save wife and children).
21 Crimes like burglary have a slightly different structure. There the specific intent
required is not self-referential in the way that the intent requiremen t for forg ery is. A
typical statute, for example, defines burglary as when a person "knowingly enters or
remains unlawfully in a building with intem to commit a crime therein." N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 140.25 (McKinney 1988) (emph asis added). There is no requireme nt that a
person intend that his act of entering the building, etc., constitute a burglary. Still,
without the special intent portion, the agent has not committed the crime of burglary,
so again, we can say that the deed cannot be done without the agent's intending something.
22 See, e.g., MoDEL PENAL CoDE § 3.04(1) (1985) (requiring that the defendant
employ force "for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force "
in order to claim self-defense) (emphasis added).
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are satisfied , entails ultimate, rather than prima facie, culpability. And
Moore's thesis is m ean t to apply at the level of prima facie culpability.
Second, even on the level of ultimate culpability where intention or
purpose is relevant, the intention enters into culpability judgments in a
differe nt way from wha t Moore seems to be suggesting. When we explore a possible justific ation or excuse, we are interested in the particular
content of the agent's re ason for violating the prohibitory norm. 23
Moore's thesis that intended violations of a prohibitory norm are worse
than merely intentional violations implies that it is not the content of the
agent's intention that is at issu e, bu t the mere fac t that the age nt intended
the violatio n, rather than foresaw it wi thout intending it. I shall henceforth refer to this thought by saying that for Moore , it is the mere form of
action done for a reason, rath er th an the content of the agent's reason for
acting, that holds moral relevance . But when justifications exonerate,
they exonerate on th e basis of the content of the reason, not on the basis
of the mere fact that there was a reas on. A similar analysis can be made of
the purpose requirement for crimes of specific intent. What matters in
each case is that the agent altered the writing or assisted the enemy with a
certain, particular intention, and not the mere fact that he did these
things intending to do them, rather than merely foreseeing that he would
do them. In neither case is the mere form of the relation between the
agen t's reason for acting and the act relevant.
V.

Two

KINDS O F J uDG MENT

The sort of culpability we have been discussing emerges from judging
things agents do. This is the sort of judgment which , to co-opt a phrase
Moore employs in another context, "take[ s] action-descriptions as [its]
object." 24 Contrast this with another sort of judgment, one that might
interest a priest, a psychotherapist, or a governor deciding whether to
grant clemency. This sort of judgment pertains to the agent's worth as a
person, not with respect to particular things she does, but with respect to
who she is. It takes as its object a person's character or soul. Now the
content of an agent's reason for acting, although irrelevant for prima facie
culpability, helps to reveal the character of the agent. When we want to
know what sort of person someone is, we want to know, roughly, his conception of the good, what it is he values. Focusing on a single action, or
even on a series of actions, is an unreliable guide to answering this question , since the person may be unable to realize his conception of the good
through his actions. This second sort of evaluation, what we might call
"character" as opposed to "act" evaluation, focuses naturally on motiva23

See generally Claire 0. Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Accoun t of the Defense in Law , 37 ARIZ. L. REV . 251 , 278-82 (1995).
24 Moore, supra note 1, at 321.
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tion, the question of why the agent did what he did. 25
Now my claim is that the thesis that the intended is significant for culpability blurs the distinction between act and character evaluatio n. TI1is
blurring first appears in Scholastic philosophy, as part of the attempt to
derive a code of conduct from the moral worth of intern al feature s, such
as the state of an agent's soul at the moment of action. Tne effort was
thus an attempt to derive a way of judging the exte rnal fro m features of
the internal. The clearest articulation of thi s methodology appears in the
Catholic Doctrine of Double Effect (DD E). 26 St. Thomas, for example ,
turns to the moral importance of what is intended as a way of arguing for
the permissibility of killing in self-defense in the face of an a bsolute prohibition on killing. 27 The DDE mai ntains that it may be permissible fo r
yo u to do a thing you merely foresee but do not intend '.vhich it would not
be permissible for you to do if yo u intended it. The doctrine is thus
designed to evade the reach of absolute prohibitions by restricting their
operation to actions performed where the prohibited thing is itself intend ed. Moore's claim is a near neighbor of the DDE: Moore should be understood as saying that the degree of culpability depends on whether the
act was intended, whereas the DDE claims that the fact that a bad act was
not intended may exonerate an agent completely. What the two cl aims
have in common is the belief in the moral significance of the intended .
There is at least one reason, however, why the moral significance of the
intended seemed sensible to Aquinas and other Catholic theologians and
why it need not seem sensible to secular ethicists: Aquinas had to grapple
with the difficulties created by Catholicism's adherence to absolute
prohibitions. In a system of absolute prohibitions, not only do ordin ary
actions taken in self-defense become difficult to justify, but one can end
up having to choose between two courses of action, both of which are
morally prohibited. If a doctor must perform high-risk surgery or a person will die, and if the doctor has a duty to do everything in her power to
treat the patient, then a system of absolute prohibitions rendering impermissible actions that impose a high risk of death on another would make
the doctor sinful regardless of what she did. The focus on the form of the
relation between acts and reasons for acting allows one to say that the
25

Moore appears to reject the connection between the content of an agent' s reasons for acting and character. !d. at 324. Since Moore does not draw the distinction
between form and content that I do, it is unclear wh eth er he is asserting that the mere
fact of aiming at harm is irrelevant to determining character, or whether it is the
content of the aim that is irrelevant. If the former, I am, of course in agreement. I am
arguing here that the latter is false .
26 For a general discussion of the doctrine in secu lar philosophy, see gene rally
Foot, supra note 12.
27 ST. THOMAS AourNAS, SuMMA TH EOLOGICA pt. Ila-IIae, Q. 64, art. 7 (Chris tian
Classics ed. 1981) (arguing that killing in self-defense is penTLiss ible because what is
intended is not slaying of aggressor but repelling of attack).
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doctor does not sin when she performs the surgery, since risking the life
of the patient is "beside the intention," while what is intended is to save a
life. But absolute prohibitions make little sense in a secular ethical system, and the focus on the form of the action makes little sense without
them. For in the absence of absolute prohibitions, there is a simpler,
more direct way to understand the permissibility of the doctor's behavior:
She has a duty to do what stands the greatest chance of saving the patient 's life, and if this means performing a high-risk operati on, she m ay do
it. Whether this mea ns that th e doctor has a justificatio n for doing what
is by nature evil, or whether th e surgery is not evil sho uld be of little
interes t to secular e thicists.
My cl aim, then , is that saddling the distinction betwee n what is inte nded and what is merely done intentionally with moral weight follo ws from
a confusion betwee n judgment of acts and judgment of agen ts. More particularl y, it follows from attempting to apply a fram ewo rk developed for
the latter in the moral domain of the former. Moreover, it does so not in
terms of the content of an agent's reason for acting, which, I have argued,
judgment of acts occasionally allows, 28 but rather in terms of the mere
fact that an agent intended to do an evil act. But the form of intentional
action is not a proper object of moral inquiry for either act or character
judgment. And while the focus on form is easy to understand in the case
of those struggling under the weight of a system of absolute prohibitions,
it is deeply puzzling in the absence of such a system.
In addition to underscoring the moral irrelevance of the form of action,
the distinction between character and act evaluation can help to explain
the conflicting intuitions we apparently have in response to similar pairs
of cases. The cases of the terror and the strategic bomber do not suggest
what they are commonly thought to suggest, namely that the terror
bomber is more culpable for the bombing than is the strategic bomber.
The intuition that the former is worse than the latter is one about persons: The terror bomber acts on a worse motivation than does the strategic bomber, and he may be a worse person for it. His act is not, however,
worse than the strategic bomber's, because both agents do the same
thing, and they both do it intentionally. The arsonist example suggests
the evaluative split more clearly: We may find that agents are equally
culpable, although one who places so low a value on human life that he
would rather kill than be inconvenienced is a worse person than one who
kills reluctantly.

VI.

THE TORT/CRIME DISTINCTION

I wish now to return to the distinction between tort and criminal liability. Criminal law, Moore and I agree, is organized around the notion of
moral culpability. This claim, however, is rather more difficult for Moore
28

See supra Part IV.
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to make than for me. If Moore thinks that the structure of culp ability in
morals differs significa ntl y fro m its counterpart in the criminal law, wh a t
is the basis for thinking that criminal law is somehow "abo ut " culp ability?
It is mo re plausible to think of the criminal law as "about" culp ability if
one believes, as I do , th at the structure of culp ability is reflect ed reasonably accurately in the structure of criminal liability. The notion of cho ice
provid es the ce ntral organizin g principl e for this shared structure: Jud gments of culpa bility of an age nt fo r a deed have, as a basic minimu m
condit ion, th at the agent ch ose to do it.
The imperfect fit be tween culpability in mo rals and culp ability in
crimes on Moore' s account helps to exp lain his view of to rt la w, namely
that tort law is also ''about" culp abili ty, only culp ability of a lo we r
gradc. 29 Moore allows that "inad verte nt risk creation cannot be acco mmodated within the ch oice m odel of cul pability." 3° Ch oice , it is clear, has
to do with awa re ness a nd contro l; o ne cannot choose to do th at which
one is unaware of doing.3 1 Thus the b asic form of tort liability, namely
negligence , will h ave to be exp lained diffe rently. One might think this
constitutes an a rgume nt against thinking of tort liability as reflecting cul pability norms, but M oore instead turns to a different brand of culpabili ty, what he calls " the culpability of unexercised capacity. " 32 But Moo re
does not explain why the latte r is a kind of culpability a t all , and in light
of the picture of culpa bility wi t h which Moore has ope rated, we are left
without a basis for including "unexercised capacity" within the fold.
If there is a unified rationale to the institution of tort law, it has noth ing to do with culpability. R athe r, the institution, at least at present, is
designed to promote social welfa re by imposing duties on agents that will
help to organize their be havio r prospecti vely in accord ance with vari o us
non-moral norms. The prima f acie conditions for tort liability are accordingly n ormative rather than psychological. If one maintains that certain
psycho logical states lie at the heart of the notion of culpability, one
should reject the suggestion th at legal schemes that do not have those
states as a necess ary co ndition fo r liability have anything to d o with culpability.
Locating cho ice at the cente r of criminal liability raises some obvio us
questions about criminal negligence and the occasional strict liability
crime. The so rt of theoretical unity that both Moore and I hope to fin d
implicit in legal institutions is , admittedl y, approximate at best. Crimes of
negligence and strict liability re main relatively rare exceptions , and grea t
expansion of these forms of liability would signal the need to revise th e
account of crimi nal li ability. This wo uld not show that we had been
wrong about the crimin al law all along, but would suggest rather that the
29
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S ee Moore, s upra no te 1, at 328.
! d.
Moore appears to agree. !d. a t 327.
! d. at 329 .
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nature of the institution had changed. Intentional torts provide the obvious objection on the civil side, but there the answer to imperfection is
rather different. Either one must say that the institution of tort law does
not form a theoretical whole, or one must appeal to the lowest common
denominator and insist that the whole that it docs form has nothing to do
with culpability. Either way, the difference between the criminal law and
tort law is that between an institution whose basic model posits culpability as a necessary condition for liability and one that does not.

